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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RANDY OLSEN, by and through his Guardian
ad Litem, Gaylen R. Olsen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COMMISSION; and FLOWELL ELECTRICAL ASSOCIATION, INC, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13867

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COMMISSION,
Third-Fatty Plaintiffs,
vs.
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, FLOWELL
NATUEE OF THE CASE
Appellant claims damages for injuries suffered in
the course of his employment in highway construction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Salt Lake County District Court, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, presiding, granted summary
judgment in favor of respondent Flowell Electrical Association on May 24, 1974. The appellant filed a mo1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion to vacate that summary judgment on July 12, 1974,
which motion was denied by Judge Taylor in an order
entered July 29,1974.
Respondent State of Utah obtained a summary judgment on October 8, 1974, the Honorable Maurice Harding, presiding.
Appellant filed Notice of Appeal from all summary
judgments on October 23,1974.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Flowell seeks affirmance of the summary judgment below and dismissal of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts requires some amplification in order to understand fully the undisputed circumstances.
Flowell is a small rural electrification association
in Millard County operated by Ralph Robinson, its manager, two fieldmen, and a part time bookkeeper.
Cox Construction crews had been constructing 1-15
through Millard County for about a year before the accident. During that time, Cox personnel became acquainted with Ralph Robinson of Flowell. (Cox Deposition pp. 8-12) Cox was aware that Robinson's home
and business telephone numbers were listed in the local
directory. (Cox Deposition pp. 25, 89) A telephone was
located in Cox's trailer within 2 blocks of the accident
site. (Cox Deposition pp. 8, 79)
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About a week before the accident Cox contacted
Robinson concerning anticipated work in the vicinity
of the power lines. Cox described the arrangements as
follows:
"Mr. Robinson said that he had quite a few customers on the line; if there was any way possible that we could pour this concrete without
cutting the power, he would appreciate it. I told
him that we had talked to the company in Salt
Lake City about using the concrete pump, which
would eliminate any movement in the area of
equipment under the power lines, or would be a
safety measure that we could take.
"Q. What did he say?
"A. He thought that was a real good idea and
he told me to let him know if we needed any help.''
(Cox Deposition p. 15)
"We talked about the possibility that the power
might have to be cut. And under those circumstances of using our crane, this was discussed.
I asked him if the power could be cut if we needed
it, and Ralph told me that he had customers on
the line, and if it was at all possible to use this
concrete pump, then it wouldn't be necessary to
cut the power.
"Q. O.K. Are you saying that you are going
to get to Ralph when and if you wanted the power
cut?
"A. Yes." (Cox Deposition p. 21)
"Q. Did you tell Ralph that you would get to
him when you wanted the power cut ?
"A. Yes.
"A. Under the circumstances of our conversation, I believe I told Ralph that if it was necessary, I would contact him." (Cox Deposition p. 22)
3
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"Q. As far as your understanding was concerned, before this accident there was no understanding on your part that Mr. Eobinson would
cut the power without receiving word from you?
"A.

Yes." (Cox Deposition p. 23)

"Q. Well, did Mr. Eobinson tell you that he
would be available at all times for the purpose
of assisting in this matter.
ii

A. Not to my knowledge.

"Q. Mr. Cox, if you decided that you wanted
to have the electricity killed on those wires how
were you going to accomplish that ?
"A. Well, I would call Mr. Eobinson, either in
his office or in his home." (Cox Deposition p. 89)
The day before the accident Cox told appellant
Olsen;
". . . we would be working around these wires
and possibly we would be working around them
or underneath them, because I planned on using
the pump for that whole pour. I didn't plan on
using the crane. But I mentioned to them that
among the other electrical generators and vibrators, that we would be working around the electricity and underneath the high tension wires,
and made known these wires presence across that
stretch.'' (Cox Deposition p. 65)
About a week after Cox had last talked with Eobinson, Cox crews positioned the pump and 2 or 3 cement
trucks for the pour. After an hour of trying to use
the pump, Cox realized it would not work. (Cox Deposition p. 27) If the pump had been used it would not
have come near the power lines. (Cox Deposition p. 96)
Cox then had the crane positioned on the north side of
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the over-pass to handle the pour. About 15 to 20 minutes after Cox realized the pump was not going to work,
he drove into Fillmore to try to locate Eobinson. It took
about 10 minutes for the drive. When he got into the
Flowell office he found no one was there. He then rode
down main street "to see if I could see the truck any
place. I couldn't see any of their employees or any
equipment, so I turned around and went back to the job
site." The trip took about 30 minutes. This occurred
sometime between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon. Cox did
not attempt to telephone Flowell's office or Eobinson's
home or to make other inquiry. (Cox Deposition pp. 24,
25, 27, 32)
When Cox returned to the job site he found that
the crane had poured two or three buckets. The pour
continued on the north side for about one hour before
Cox had the crane moved to the south side. (Cox Deposition pp. 35, 36, 60) In this position about 50 passes
were made by the crane. (Cox Deposition pp. 63, 64)
All concerned were aware of the hazards if the boom
contacted the power lines. They tried to keep the boom
as flat or as near parallel to the ground as they could.
(Cox Deposition pp. 67, 68, 93) Generally the boom
did not come closer than 20 feet to the lines. (Cox Deposition p. 38) Although Mr. Easmussen, the state's
representative on the job, had not required or requested
that Cox have the power turned off, he did ask the Cox
crew to move the crane on two occasions shortly before
the accident. (Cox Deposition pp. 84, 85; Easmussen Deposition p. 129) Just before the accident Cox told his
crew:
5
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" ( I ) didn't want them to go any further to the
east and wanted them to stay in exactly the same
position that they had previously been, just previously dumped a bucket of concrete, and I wanted
them to dump it in the exact same place, and
they would probably have to do a little bit more
shoveling that way, but that I felt this was necessary." (Cox Deposition pp. 68, 69)
About 5 to 10 minutes before the accident Cox told
the crane operator that "he would probably have to
move the crane." Cox planned to have the crane moved
after dumping the bucket which was being poured when
the accident occurred. (Cox Deposition pp. 71, 72)
The boom contacted the power line and power surged
into the plaintiff who was not wearing rubber boots or
gloves. (Cox Deposition pp. 78, 104, 105)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW FLOWELL WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT.
Appellant contends that Flowell should have assigned an employee to the job site. The schedule for
the pour under the power lines was indefinite until the
day before the accident. It would be completely unreasonable to expect or require Flowell or any utility to
have a representative continuously located at the construction site waiting indefinitely for possible needs to
develop, nor was any such request made by Cox or the
state representative on the job site. Rather, all concerned were satisfied with the normal arrangements:
if and when it looked like Cox crews would be using a
6
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crane in close proximity to the power lines, then Flowell
wrould be contacted by Cox before that event. Until the
morning of the accident and the failure of the pump to
function, there was no use of or plan by Cox Construction to use the crane in close proximity to the power
lines. The plan was to use a pump. A pump was used.
The pump failed. The crane was placed in operation.
Thereafter Cox made a brief, belated effort to contact
Robinson, and state representatives cautioned the Cox
crew to move the crane away from the power lines. Cox
controlled the situation. Cox obviously was going to,
and did, proceed with the use of the crane whether Robinson was immediately available or not. Robinson certainly required some time to complete whatever he was
doing and respond to any request to turn off the power
at the construction site and make appropriate arrangements for other power users who would be affected by
any power shut down. Robinson had no reason to think
that Cox would not contact him substantially before any
need arose to shut off power or that Cox would not hold
up or adjust its operations until Robinson was advised
and had an opportunity to respond.
It is not true, as appellant alleges, that on the morning of the accident there was any probability that the
crane would be operated close to the power lines or that
Robinson had any reason to expect that such would take
place before Cox contacted Robinson as promised. If,
as appellant contends, Flowell was bound to anticipate
negligent conduct of construction crews in the presence
of state representatives, then Flowell would become an
insurer of all persons injured by its power lines. The
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Industrial Commission regulations did not require, nor
did the state representatives or Cox request or require,
a Flowell representative to be present at the construction site on the morning of the accident. Foresight, not
hindsight, is the test.
As a matter of law, Flowell was in no wise negligent and did not cause this accident.
In Pascoe v. Southern California Edison, 102 Ca.2d
254, 227 P.2d 555 (1951) a contractor notified the power
company that in the course of its widening a highway
it would blast underneath high tension wires but did not
specify date on which blasting would actually occur nor
request a shut off of electricity. The court held that the
power company had no legal duty to act on the notification when received or six weeks later when blasting occurred, and power company was not negligent in the
electrocution of contractor's employee.
POINT II
THE NEGLIGENCE OF COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
The instant case is not distinguishable with respect
to proximate cause from Torna v. Utah Power & Light,
121 U.2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961). Here, and in Torna,
the contractor knew that the power had not been turned
off, although means had been arranged to do so, namely,
by notifying the power company in advance of need.
In Toma, although this court necessarily assumed for
purposes of appeal that the power company had rejected a specific request by the contractor to turn off
8
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the power and was thus negligent, the court nonetheless
affirmed that the crane operator's negligence was the
sole proximate. The facts in the instant case are even
stronger in that here the appellant does not contend that
Flowell had been requested to turn off the power.
Appellant argues that a question of fact exists as
to whether Flowell had a duty to foresee that at some
indefinite time Cox Construction would not use the
pump, would use the crane, would not further contact
Flowell, and would use the crane in close proximity to
the power lines despite warnings from state representatives. Such anticipation defies common sense and experience.
The full responsibility and control of the situation
was in the hands of Cox Construction Company, an experienced and professional operation. The acts and
omissions of Cox Construction Company were the sole
proximate cause of the accident. See Merlo v. Public
Service, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942); Isbell v. Union Light,
Heat & Power, 162 Fed. Supp. 471 (1958); and Malatesta
v. Atlantic City and S. R. Company, 96 A. 54 (1915).
POINT III
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO TIMELY
APPEAL THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF FLOWELL,
The summary judgment in favor of Flowell was a
final judgment within the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and
the provisions of Rule 72(a) and 73(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
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That summary judgment finally disposed of all the
issues between appellant and Flowell. Appellant's cause
of action against Flowell was separate from and in no
way dependent upon the plaintiff's causes of action
against the State of Utah. The appellant therefore is
obligated to file any appeal within one month of the
final adjudication. See Springer Transfer Co. v. Board
of Commissioners, 43 N.M. 444, 94 P.2d 977 (1939);
Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P.2d
1277 (1937); 4 Am.Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error, §§ 53 and
54; and Shurte v. Thorley, 90 U. 381, 61 P.2d 1262.
The appellant failed to appeal Flowell's summary
judgment of May 24, 1974 until October 24, 1974, more
than one month later.
CONCLUSION
The court should affirm the summary judgment in
favor of Flowell because Flowell was not negligent and
the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Cox Construction. Appellant's appeal of the
Flowell summary judgment should be dismissed because
that appeal was not timely filed.
Respectfully submitted,

-•-

JAY E. JENSEN
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER,
JENSEN & EVANS
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Flowell Electrical
Association, Inc.
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